Hedonic pricing with quasilinear preferences is shown to be equivalent to stable matching with transferable utilities and a participation constraint, and to an optimal transportation (Monge-Kantorovich) linear programming problem. Optimal assignments in the latter correspond to stable matchings, and to hedonic equilibria. These assignments are shown to exist in great generality; their marginal indirect payoffs with respect to agent type are shown to be unique whenever direct payoffs vary smoothly with type. Under a generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition (also known as a twist condition) the assignments are shown to be unique and to be pure, meaning the matching is one-to-one outside a negligible set. For smooth problems set on compact, 2 connected type spaces such as the circle, there is a topological obstruction to purity, but we give a weaker condition still guaranteeing uniqueness of the stable match.
Introduction
The goal of this note is to establish and exploit a general, structural equivalence result between three families of models, two of which are familiar to economists while the third belongs in mathematics and operational research. Specifically, we consider a general framework for studying hedonic price problems with quasi-linear preferences, and show that it is equivalent to a matching model with transferable utilities. From a mathematical perspective, both problems can in turn be rephrased under the form of a linear program, in fact an optimal transportation problem of Monge-Kantorovich type. Secondly, we argue that, due to the wide body of knowledge about linear programming in general, and optimal transportation in particular (see for example [3] and [35] ), the reduction of the model to this form seems not only conceptually clearer, but better adapted to bringing powerful methods of theoretical and computational analysis to bear on the question.
As an illustration, we first provide a general existence result for the models under consideration. The result is valid for matching as well as hedonic pricing models. It applies to multidimensional problems, and does not require single crossing conditionsà la Spence-Mirrlees. 1 In the smooth setting, we establish uniqueness of the marginal payoff with respect to type, even though the optimal matching can be non-unique.
We also clarify the role of the well known Spence-Mirrlees condition, also called the twist condition in the mathematical literature. In the one-dimensional setting usually considered by economists, the condition guarantees some form of assortative matching -which, in turn, implies that the equilibrium is both unique and pure, (purity meaning the matching is one-to-one for almost all agents). As we discuss below, the notions of purity and uniqueness generalize naturally to multi-dimensions, whereas the notion of assortative matching does not.
We first describe a generalization of the Spence-Mirrlees condition that is valid in general type spaces, does not require differentiability of the surplus function, allows for non-participation, and is not dependent on the coordinates (i.e. the parametrization) of the problem. We then show that this condition, while sufficient, is not necessary for uniqueness of the stable match. In particular, we discuss an example in which the stable match is unique although the Spence-Mirrlees condition is violated. In such a case, however, the solution fails to be pure. That is, when Spence-Mirrlees does not hold, it may be the case that identical agents on one side of the market are matched with different counterparts, a situation that might be interpreted in terms of mixed strategies. Lastly, we provide a new and weaker condition that guarantees uniqueness of the stable match in the matching model (or of the equilibrium in the hedonic model) even in the absence of pure matching.
In both hedonic models and matching (or assignment) models, much of the intuition economists have developed is restricted to models in which either there is a finite number of types or in which the agents in the model can be described by a one dimensional characteristic under a single-crossing property. Much of the discussion in the theoretical and empirical literature focuses on whether there is positive assortative matching. The optimal transportation approach, initially introduced by Shapley and Shubik [31] and extended to a continuous setting by Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame [15] , opens up the study of hedonic and matching models with multidimensional characteristics, general surplus functions, and general distributions of types. The present paper reviews the relevant results from this literature showing how they can be applied in these economic settings. Further, it highlights some significant issues related to the geometry and topology of the type spaces which have not previously been explored, neither in the economics nor the mathematics literature. For example, when agent types are located on a circle, a sphere, or products thereof (such as a periodic square), no smooth generalization of the Spence-Mirrlees condition can hold, and stable matchings (or assignments) are not generally pure. The subtwist criterion we introduce resolves assignment uniqueness in some of these settings, but leaves others as open challenges. An interesting question that we do not discuss relates to the continuity or smoothness of the dependence of the buyer's characteristics on those of the seller with whom he chooses to match. Significant recent progress on this question is surveyed by Villani in [37] .
Our work builds upon and extends several existing contributions in economics and in mathematics. Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame [15] , [16] also study the matching of buyers and sellers in an economy with potentially a continuum of agents. In their economy, buyers and sellers who match are not free to trade any contract. Rather each seller is endowed with a single contract that they can sell or not. Their economy is thus a hedonic endowment economy, while ours can be seen as hedonic production one. Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame [15] shows that equilibrium in the endowment economy is equivalent to an optimal transportation problem and to a matching problem. They also prove that equilibrium exists. Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame [16] analyze the equilibrium in the endowment economy and focus on its links with perfect competition. They prove that in the continuum economy, perfect competition (the inability of individuals to influence price) obtains when the social gains function (i.e. the value of the primal program) is differentiable, or equivalently when the solution to the dual is unique. They also prove that perfect competition is generic and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness of the dual solution. They do not analyze uniqueness of the optimal assignment or purity of the solution.
Our approach can also be viewed as a simplification of the more complex (but ultimately equivalent) formulation of the problem as a convex nonlinear program due to Ekeland [9] , [10] , and subsequently developed in his joint work with Carlier [7] . In particular, Ekeland [9] , [10] also points out the similarity between hedonic models and optimal transportation problems. He proves existence of equilibrium under conditions very similar to ours and uniqueness and purity under an analogous version of the multidimensional Spence-Mirrlees condition. However, he does not consider our weaker, sufficient condition for uniqueness.
On the mathematical side, multi-dimensional generalizations of the Spence-Mirrlees condition developed through work of many authors, including [37] . Special cases of costs satisfying the subtwist condition were investigated by Uckelmann [34] , McCann [25] , Gangbo and McCann [13] , Plakhov [28] , and Ahmad [1] . In the absence of a Spence-Mirrlees criterion, our uniqueness assignment result relies on Hestir and Williams' sufficient condition for extremality among doubly stochastic measures [18] , and a variant thereon from Ahmad, Kim and McCann [2] .
The basic framework

The competitive hedonic model
Consider a competitive spot market in which sellers produce and buyers acquire objects or contracts z which come in a wide range of qualities z ∈ Z 0 . What is peculiar to many competitive hedonic markets, including those for housing, workers, vegetables, automobiles, pensions, insurance contracts, and many others, is that in the spot market for these contracts, a large number of buyers and sellers trade fixed quantities, often small, of contracts whose value (to buyers and/or sellers) depend on quantifiable qualities, or characteristics. 2 These "hedonic" characteristics are known to the buyers and/or sellers at the time of the transaction and as a result are reflected in the equilibrium market price.
Assuming buyer and seller preferences have been specified, the problem posed by such a market is to decide how supply equilibrates with demand to determine the set of contracts actually exchanged on the market (or the set of commodities actually produced and consumed), and the price P (z) at which each type of contract is traded. Note that such an equilibrium implicitly defines a pairing or matching of buyers with sellers who choose to enter into this market by agreeing to contract or exchange with each other.
Standing hypotheses: The sets X 0 , Y 0 , Z 0 , of buyer, seller, and contract types, may be modeled as subsets of complete separable metric spaces, possibly multidimensional. To allow for the possibility that some agents choose not to participate, we augment the spaces X :
by including an isolated point in each: a partner ∅ X for any unmatched sellers, a partner ∅ Y for any unmatched buyers, and the null contract ∅ Z . Preferences are encoded into functions representing the utility u(x, z) of product z ∈ Z to buyer x ∈ X, and the utility (disutility or cost) v(y, z) of product z ∈ Z to seller y ∈ Y . These utility functions u :
are specified a priori, along with nonnegative Borel measures µ 0 on X 0 and ν 0 on Y 0 of finite total mass representing the distribution of buyer and seller types throughout the population. The utility functions are constrained so that neither the dummy buyer type ∅ X nor the dummy seller type ∅ Y can participate in any exchange save the null contract:
while the measures µ 0 and ν 0 are extended to X and Y by assigning mass ν 0 (Y 0 ) + 1 and µ 0 (X 0 ) + 1 to the points ∅ X and ∅ Y respectively:
The augmented measures balance µ[X] = ν[Y ] < ∞, so we can renormalize them to be probability measures (i.e. have unit mass) without loss of generality. 3 To guarantee the convergence of various integrals, and attainment of various suprema and infima, we assume throughout (and tacitly hereafter) that u(x, z) < ∞ extends upper semicontinuously to the completion of X × Z and v(y, z) > −∞ lower semicontinuously to the completion of Y × Z. We normalize the utility of the null-contract to be zero
which can be achieved without loss of generality if the reserve utilities u(x, ∅ Z ) ∈ L 1 (X, dµ) and v(y, ∅ Z ) ∈ L 1 (Y, dν) are continuous and integrable, by subtracting them from u and v. Define the pairwise surplus function
We assume that for each pair the supremum is attained. Further, in case u or v is discontinuous or Z fails to be compact [19] , we assume the set of contracts
that maximize the surplus (4) is non-empty, compact, and depends upper hemicontinuously on (x, y) ∈ X × Y . It is well-known [19] that there exists a measurable selection, i.e., a Borel function
In case u or −v fails to be bounded, we assume there existq ∈ L 1 (X, dµ) andr ∈ L 1 (Y, dν) which extend to real-valued lower semi-continuous functions on the completions cl X and cl Y of their domains such that
for all z ∈ Z. This is roughly equivalent to the existence of prices on Z which make the indirect utilities integrable. Given any µ-measurable map
Here µ-measurability simply means f −1 (B) differs from a Borel set by set of µ outer-measure zero. Suppose P : Z −→ R ∪ {±∞} denotes the competitive market price of quality z ∈ Z. To allow non-participation, it is subject to the constraint P (∅ Z ) = 0. We assume that buyer utility is linear in price so that in such a market, the indirect utility available to buyer type x ∈ X is defined by the quasi-linear utility maximization
Here U (x) ≥ 0 is non-negative since ∅ Z ∈ Z; each buyer x retains the right not to consume. Similarly, we assume seller utility is linear in price so that the indirect utility available to seller type y ∈ Y is given by the utility maximization
with V (y) ≥ 0 and vanishing in the case of non-participation. We make the conventions (−∞) − (−∞) = −∞ and ∞ − ∞ = −∞ to resolve ambiguities in (7)- (8) .
Let α be a non-negative measure on X × Y × Z. The support of α refers to the smallest closed set Spt (α) ⊆ X × Y × Z of full mass. The measure α represents an assignment of buyers and sellers to each other and to products. We use the push-forward notation to denote its marginal projections π X # α and π Y # α under mappings such as π X (x, y, z) = x and π Y (x, y, z) = y on X ×Y ×Z.
The pair (α, P ) is an hedonic equilibrium if these projections coincide with the initial measures on each set:
and if, for α-almost all points (x, y, z) ∈ Spt α, we have that
In such an equilibrium, each triple (x, y, z) ∈ Spt α represents a mutually agreeable exchange of contract z between seller y and buyer x, where z is a contract most favored by both seller y and buyer x independently, given market prices P . The prices are market clearing, in the sense that the assignment α is consistent with the utility maximization of both buyers and sellers (10) while simultaneously balancing supply with demand (9) . Since the prices of untraded commodities potentially affect the indirect utilities U (x) and V (y), prices for these commodities are subject to upper and lower bounds in a market at equilibrium. We use the term market clearing pair synonymously with equilibrium pair. This notion of equilibrium allows for the possibility that some agents are indifferent between multiple qualities in Z. Indeed, when α assigns a buyer x to multiple sellers or contracts, we may interpret the conditional distribution implied by α as a mixed strategy for buyer x. In such an equilibrium, the assignment α must still ensure that the number of buyers and sellers of each contract type are compatible in the sense of (9).
The associated matching problem
Similarly, models of one-to-one matching with transferable utility are used to analyze marriage markets, labour markets and the matching of students to schools to understand who matches with whom in an equilibrium stable matching. In these models the partners on each side of the matching have characteristics that affect the surplus that may be attained by any matched pair. The characteristics of the agents matched are reflected in the equilibrium matching and in the utility payoffs that each agent obtains. Formally, a matching model is defined by two spaces X and Y defined as above and an upper semicontinuous mapping s : cl(X × Y ) −→ [0, ∞[ which represents the surplus that can be generated by any pair (x, y) in X × Y if matched together. Under transferable utility, for any match (x, y) the surplus s (x, y) can be distributed between the partners: i.e., x receives some u (x) and y receives some v (y) with u (x) + v (y) = s (x, y).
As stated in introduction, there is a natural, one-to-one correspondence between hedonic models and matching problems. We first characterize the pairwise matching problem derived from the hedonic price model just described.
Characterization: The basic idea is very simple. For each pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y , recall the pairwise surplus function s defined in (4) . In words, whenever a buyer x is matched with a seller y, they generate together the total surplus s(x, y), defined as a maximum over the set Z of possible commodities. Then s : X × Y −→ [0, ∞[ is upper semicontinuous by our assumptions (3), and the 8 set Z (x, y) where the supremum is attained (5) is non-empty, compact-valued, and upper hemicontinuous. Our normalizations (1)-(3) permit either buyer or seller to go unmatched (to match with a null type) and force the utility of the unmatched state to be zero:
One can then define a pairwise matching problem by the set of buyers (X, µ), the set of sellers (Y, ν), and the pairwise surplus defined by the surplus function s. An assignment (or a matching) is defined as a measure γ on X ×Y , the marginals of which coincide with µ and ν. Using the same notations as above, we thus write that
where the projection mappings π X (x, y) = x and π Y (x, y) = y this time are
, we say that x and y are matched. A buyer may be matched to multiple sellers and vice versa. If x ∈ X 0 and there is no y ∈ Y 0 such that (x, y) ∈ Spt (γ) , we say that x is unmatched (and similarly for y).
A payoff corresponding to γ is a pair of functionsŪ : X → R andV : Y → R with the normalizationŪ (∅ X ) = 0 such that for any (x, y) ∈ Spt (γ),
Finally, an outcome is defined as a triple γ,Ū ,V where Ū ,V is a payoff corresponding to γ. We have thus showed how one can associate, to any hedonic problem, a matching model. Note that the converse is also true: for every matching problem defined by the upper semicontinuous surplus function s(x, y), one can trivially construct a hedonic problem from a suitable choice of utility functions.
For example Z = Y , u = s, with v(y, y) = 0 and v(x, z) = +∞ for all z = y. Smoother examples are more involved to articulate but also possible; in fact, every upper semicontinuous surplus function s(x, y) ≥ 0 and continuous assignment z(x, y) can be shown to arise from a hedonic model.
Stability
Following the literature 4 , we define stability by:
Note, that this definition implies that a stable outcome satisfies
for all x ∈ X and for all y ∈ Y. In words: a match is stable if two conditions are fulfilled:
1. No matched agent would be better off unmatched. 2. No two agents x and y, who are not matched together, would both prefer being matched together than their current situation.
To see the link between the formal and informal definitions, consider an outcome γ,Ū ,V that satisfies (13) . The functionsŪ (x) andV (y) can be interpreted as the utilities derived by x and y from the outcome at stake. As noted above, restriction (13) immediately implies condition one. In addition, restriction (13) along with the definition of a payoff implies thatŪ (x)+V (y) = s (x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ Spt (γ). Finally, restriction (13) guarantees that any two agents (x, y) / ∈ Spt (γ) who are not matched with each other, cannot generate a surplus larger thanŪ (x) +V (y) . Indeed, if x and y were such that s (x, y) >Ū (x)+V (y), then it would be the case that (i) they are not matched together in the outcome under consideration, and (ii) they can both improve their utility by leaving their current situation and rematching together. But such a situation would violate the definition of stability.
Finally, a matching γ is stable if there exists a payoff Ū ,V such that the outcome γ,Ū ,V is stable.
A well known result, in our transferable utility context, is that a matching is stable if and only if it maximizes total surplus. 5 It follows that the matching problem is itself equivalent to a linear programming problem of the optimal transportation type, as we next discuss. 10 
The transportation problem
We claim that in fact both hedonic pricing and stable matching lead to the problem of pairing buyers (X, µ) with sellers (Y, ν) so as to optimize the average (or total) of the surplus function s(x, y). This problem can be expressed as a linear program:
over the set of measures
with prescribed marginals. Here the π are the projections: π X (x, y) = x and π Y (x, y) = y. 
Then the Kantorovich dual program is:
where Lip s (µ, ν) consists of all pairs of functions q ∈ L 1 (X, dµ) with q(∅ X ) = 0 and r ∈ L 1 (Y, dν) which satisfy the constraint 6
Interestingly, the dual constraints (17) exactly reproduce the stability conditions (13) of the matching problem. Indeed, for any stable match, the dual variables q (x) and r (y) can be interpreted as a payoff.
A key property of the primal-dual pair is that for all γ that are feasible for (MK) and for all pairs (q, r) feasible for (MK )
Moreover, a feasible triple (γ, q, r) produces equality in (18) (if and) only if γ maximizes (MK) and the pair (q, r) minimize (MK ). The only if statement is obvious and plays a crucial role hereafter; the if statement is the basic duality result from linear programming (see e.g., Anderson and Nash [3] , Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame [15] or Villani [35] ); it can also be recovered as a special instance of the existence of a Nash equilibrium in an infinite-dimensional, two-player, zero-sum, bilinear, mixed-strategy game [38] .
3 Stable matching and hedonic pricing via optimal transportation
The matching problem: an existence result
A first outcome of the previous arguments is a general existence result for the optimal transportation problem, therefore for the matching problem. Specifically, the upper semi-continuity of s(x, y) ≥ 0 guarantees that the maximum (14) is attained. It has a finite value if the dual problem is feasible in which case the minimum (16) is also attained [21] . To summarize, we quote Theorem 5.10 of [37] , giving the obvious extension from complete separable metric spaces to subsets X and Y thereof, whose closures will be denoted cl X and cl Y :
Theorem 1 (Existence and duality) Let subsets X and Y of complete, separable metric spaces be equipped with Borel probability measures µ and ν and an upper semicontinuous function s :
Then the maximum (14) is attained by some γ ∈ Γ (µ, ν) and the minimum (16) 
< ∞, and γ assigns zero outer measure to the complement of the zero set
Proof SinceX := cl X andỸ = cl Y are themselves complete separable metric spaces, the theorem follows immediately from [ Notice our assumptions (3)-(6) on the utilities u(x, z) and v(y, z) imply the surplus s(x, y) defined by (4) satisfies all hypotheses of this theorem.
Remark 1 (s-convex payoff functions) Define
in which case we say q is s-convex and r iss-convex [29] [35] . It is important to note that any feasible pair (q, r) in (16) can be replaced by (r s , r) and hence (r s , r ss ) without increase in cost. Since r sss = ((r s )s) s = r s , it costs no generality to take (q, r) = (r s , qs), meaning q = qs s and r = r ss . Any minimizing pair from the theorem above therefore satisfies (q, r) = (r s , r ss ) on a set of full µ × ν measure -which implies the µ-measurability of the sconvex minimizer r s (and the ν-measurability of rs s ) as required. If s is actually continuous then all s-convex functions are lower semi-continuous (hence Borel measurable) whether or not they are minimizers. These well known facts play a key role in the proof that the minimum is attained, in the developments to come, and in computational strategies to approximate a solution to the minimization.
The geometry of the set S defined in (19) takes center stage in the analysis which follows, since this set determines which buyers can match with which sellers at equilibrium. For example, it is well known that in the one dimensional matching model with D 2 xy s (x, y) > 0, there is a unique optimal assignment that involves positive assortative matching. In this case, the set S is the graph of a strictly increasing function y = f (x) .
Economically, the solutions (q, r) of the dual problem are also important because they represent the utility payoffs obtained by each type. Even for x ∈ Spt µ, the range of allowed values for q(x) has economic relevance, since it bounds the payoff available when a few new buyers of type x choose to enter the established market; similarly, at y ∈ Spt ν the range of values for r(y) bounds the payoff available when a few sellers of type y enter the established market.
Existence of an hedonic equilibrium
It remains to show that the existence result obtained in the matching problem implies the existence of an hedonic equilibrium. Given the structure of the relationship between the two problems, it is clear that if buyer x and seller y are matched in the matching problem, they will trade some common quality z in an hedonic equilibrium. What has to be constructed is a price schedule P (z) that supports those trades.
Recall the definition of Z(x, y) given in (5) and let z 0 (x, y) ∈ Z (x, y) be a measurable selection. The main result is the following: Proposition 2 (Equilibrium prices) Let γ solve the primal program (14) and (q, r) solve the dual program (16) . Then there exist a price function P :
Note that the left side of (22) , P max (z) , is the minimum equilibrium willingness to accept of all sellers in the market: no sellers will trade z unless P (z) ≥ P max (z). Similarly, the right side of (22) , P min (z) , is the maximum equilibrium willingness to pay of all buyers. No buyers will trade z unless P (z) ≤ P min (z) . When P max (z) > P min (z) no trade takes place. When P max (z) = P min (z) , an exchange may be made by the set of buyers and sellers who attain the infimum and supremum.
Proof Combining (17) with the definition of the surplus s:
which shows that P max (z) ≥ P min (z). Now, choose any function P (z) satisfying (22); the infimum or supremum themselves would suffice. (17); i.e. whenever γ matches buyer x with seller y. Considerx who is matched withȳ, in the sense that they belong to the Borel set S defined in (19) . This is the set of full γ measure where equality holds in the dual inequality constraints. Since the pair (x,ȳ) agree on their preferred contracts z ∈ Z(x,ȳ) attaining (4),
Since the equalities hold for (x,ȳ,z) in a set (S × Z) ∩ Spt α of full measure for α, we conclude that (α, P ) is a market-clearing hedonic equilibrium pair.
The result implies that to any stable match corresponds an hedonic equilibrium. Therefore, the existence result derived in the previous section has the immediate, following consequence:
Corollary 1 The hedonic model described in Section 1 has an equilibrium.
It is important to note that existence obtains in a general context. No restriction is imposed on the dimension of the spaces at stake nor on the measures describing the distributions of types. Both discrete and continuous distributions are allowed. Moreover, no specific assumptions are made on u and v beyond the standard ones. In particular, we do not assume any Spence-Mirrlees condition. Our result thus establishes the existence of hedonic equilibria in a fully general context. 7 Finally, it is interesting to note that the converse is also true: to any hedonic equilibrium, one can associate a stable match, as asserted by the following result:
# α maximizes the primal problem (14) . Here π X (x, y, z) = x and π Y (x, y, z) = y.
Proof First observe that equilibrium condition (9) states that γ has µ and ν for marginals, hence is a feasible competitor in the Monge-Kantorovich primal program (14) . The definitions (7) and (8) 
for all z ∈ Z. Taking the supremum over z ∈ Z implies that (U, V ) is a feasible pair for the Kantorovich dual program (16) ; they are lower semi-continuous due to continuity of u and of v. Moreover, equilibrium condition (10) forces equality in (23) for α-a.e. (x, y, z) ∈ Spt (α) , hence
The lower bounds U, V ≥ 0 permit this to be integrated against α, yielding
Hence γ maximizes the primal program whilst the pair (U, V ) minimizes the dual program.
In other words, (i) the hedonic pricing problem with quasilinear utility, (ii) the stable matching problem with transferable utility, and (iii) the optimal transportation problem are equivalent; none is more nor less general than the others. Moreover, approximate solutions can be computed using linear programming techniques. This opens up the study of these problems in empirical settings in which the type spaces are high dimensional, have both discrete and continuous elements, and have different dimensions on the buyer and seller side of the market. More work needs to be done to study these problems in these applied settings.
In theoretical settings, one obtains necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal assignment or the stable matching, now shown to exist, via the Kuhn-Tucker conditions from linear programming. The form of these conditions in the optimal transportation context is well-understood [29] [37] . In a suitably weak topology, one could also show that the solution depends continuously on the data in the sense that the limit of a sequence of solutions to different problems is a solution of the limiting problem. However, to make concrete statements about uniqueness of the solution or the form of the optimal measure γ, one requires additional structure on the problem. This is the topic of the next section.
Uniqueness and purity
Pure solutions
We consider two properties of the equilibrium, namely uniqueness and purity. Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame [15] study whether the dual has unique solutions; i.e. whether the equilibrium payoffs to agents are unique. They derive a condition equivalent to this in terms of differentiability of the social gains function, prove genericity of this property, and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness of payoffs in a certain range of environments.
When empirical issues are at stake, however, uniqueness of payoffs may not be sufficient. Two issues should be considered here. First, uniqueness of the matching itself is an important property; if not satisfied, more sophisticated econometric techniques are needed to account for the possible multiplicity of equilibria. Second, empirical works devoted to identification (particularly in the hedonic framework) usually assume that the equilibrium is pure, in the sense that the mapping between producers and buyers is deterministic (or, equivalently, the support of the optimal measure in the X × Y space is born by the graph of a function). Intuitively, an equilibrium is pure if (almost) all agents have a pure strategy at equilibrium -i.e., for each agent there exists one trading partner that she chooses with probability one. In the opposite case of a non-pure equilibrium, a non-null set of agents are either indifferent between several partners, or indifferent between action and inaction; then equilibrium may require randomization or mixed strategies. Again, such situations require the use of econometric techniques specifically designed for set identification.
On both issues, the reader is referred to the paper by Galichon and Henry in this issue.
In the smooth setting, we first complement existing results by giving alternative sufficient conditions for uniqueness of marginal payoffs in terms of exogenous parameters of the hedonic model. We then focus our attention on purity, and show that a generalized version of the standard, Spence-Mirrlees condition guarantees both uniqueness and purity of the optimal solution. Finally, we provide a weaker condition that is sufficent for uniqueness, but not for purity, of the solution.
A couple of well-known examples illustrate these ideas. We start with a standard situation in which the Spence-Mirrlees condition guarantees a unique, pure equilibrium. At the opposite end of the spectrum, we may have models in which a continuum of (pure and non-pure) equilibria exist:
Example 2 (Orthogonal surplus) Consider a plane, and let X 0 be the interval [0, 1] on the horizontal axis, and Y 0 be the interval − 1 2 , 1 2 on the vertical axis; both sets are equipped with the uniform distribution. Finally, consider the surplus s (x, y) = 2 − x 2 − y 2 ; i.e., any match generates a surplus of two, from which a transportation cost equal to the square of the distance between the two points is withdrawn. Then the maximum aggregate surplus, equal to 5/12, is obtained by uncountably many measures γ, including pure solutions (e.g., the uniform distribution over the graph of functions like f (x) = 1/2 − x or f (x) = x − 1/2) and non-pure solutions (e.g. the uniform distribution over the square [0, 1] × − 1 2 , 1 2 ). These examples suggest interesting conclusions. First, additional restrictions are clearly needed to guarantee either uniqueness or purity. In the first example, a standard Spence-Mirrlees condition produces assortative matching, which in turn guarantees uniqueness and purity. Note, however, that in this example (as in the second one) the sets X 0 and Y 0 are one-dimensional.
When we move away from the one dimensional matching model, the concept of assortative matching is not well-defined. In such economies, in which X 0 and Y 0 are not subsets of the real line and the surplus s need not be differentiable, a condition more general than the Spence-Mirrlees conditions above is required. In this section we recall such a condition. The generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition (or 'twist condition', as it is known in the mathematics literature) is sufficient for both uniqueness and purity. We develop a version of this condition that is valid in general type spaces, does not require differentiability of the surplus function, allows for non-participation, and is not dependent on the coordinates (i.e. the parametrization) of the problem. This condition also need only apply to either the buyers or the sellers.
Finally, we emphasize that uniqueness and purity are different concepts. For instance, a unique equilibrium may fail to be pure, as we illustrate in an example. Therefore, we introduce a condition (called subtwist below) weaker than generalized Spence-Mirrlees, and we show that this condition is sufficient for uniqueness but not purity. Let us define the concept of pure matchings formally.
be subsets of complete, separable metric spaces augmented with isolated points ∅ X , ∅ Y , and equipped with Borel probability measures µ and ν. A feasible (but not necessarily optimal) solution γ ∈ Γ (µ, ν) to (MK) program (14) is pure if there exists a function f : X 0 −→ Y such that γ is concentrated on the graph of f , in the sense that γ assigns zero outer measure to the set
In words, if the solution is pure, then there exists a well-defined function f such that any x ∈ X 0 is matched with probability one to y = f (x). The set of buyers who remain indifferent between action or inaction, or between two or more preferred sellers, forms a set of measure zero; almost every buyer has a pure (as opposed to mixed) preference for whether he wishes to buy, and if so from whom. Such a pure solution will entail a pure matching of buyers and sellers to products if Z(x, f (x)) := arg max
Note that most empirical studies consider only solutions which are pure, and for which Z(x, f (x)) consists of a single contract (for µ almost all x ∈ X 0 ).
A generalized Spence-Mirrlees (twist) condition
A standard tool in economic approaches to matching or hedonic problems is the Spence-Mirrlees condition -also known as the twist condition in the mathematics literature [37] . Though the Spence-Mirrlees condition has been generalized to multidimensional type spaces -see Gangbo [11] , Carlier [6] , or Ma, Trudinger, and Wang [23] -one may notice that the vast majority of economic studies still adopt a one-dimensional version of the condition.
Let us first specialize to the Lipschitz-buyer setting, meaning the space of buyers X 0 is an n-dimensional manifold (smooth without loss of generality), and the surplus function s(x, y) and distribution dµ 0 (x) of buyers enjoy a sufficiently smooth dependence on x ∈ X 0 , as we now make precise. We describe this setting as Lipschitz-buyer to emphasize that Y 0 and Z 0 may or may not be smooth manifolds, and could even be finite spaces as when a continuum of buyers match with finitely many sellers. In this and subsequent definitions (of the twist and subtwist conditions, and of numbered limb systems), we go to some trouble to define notions which are independent of local choices of coordinates on the manifold X 0 . The reason for this is the following. Imagine a model which matches workers with varying skill levels x ∈ X 0 with firms which employ different technologies y ∈ Y 0 . Obviously the skill level of the workers can be assessed (or parameterized) in many different ways. However, the question of whether the surplus function s(x, y) is Lipschitz, semiconvex, twisted or subtwisted should be independent of the methodology used to assess the worker's skill levels, at least among methodologies which provide equivalent information. This principle of parametrization independence also plays a striking role in the theory addressing smoothness of the assignment y = f (x) of workers to tasks [22] . The reader may prefer to skip the formal definitions, consulting instead the examples of relevance immediately thereafter.
Definition 3 (Lipschitz and semiconvex functions)
there is a constant C B depending on the coordinates and the ball, but independent of y, such that all x,x ∈ B R satisfy
where x = x, x 1/2 denotes the distance and inner product in coordinates. This definition of semiconvexity -which is sometimes called locally uniform subdifferentiability -is weaker than the standard one, in which 2ω B (r) = C B r 2 , but has been chosen for consistency with usage in [37, Proposition 10.12]. It might be appropriate to add the adjective local to the definitions of Lipschitz and semiconvex given above, as Villani does, but since differentiable manifolds are defined by local charts, there is no good definition for what it might mean for a function thereon to be globally Lipschitz, so we omit the adjective local for brevity whenever we feel confusion cannot arise. For this purpose, we overlook the fact that X 0 was assumed to be a metric space at the outset.
Definition 4 (Lipschitz-buyer and semiconvex-buyer settings) Assume, in addition to the hypotheses of Theorem 1, that X 0 is a smooth ndimensional manifold and µ a Borel probability measure on X := X 0 ∪ {∅ X }. The setting is Lipschitz-buyer if µ concentrates no mass on subsets of X 0 which have zero volume, and if moreover the surplus function s ∈ C(X ×Y ) is locally Lipschitz on X 0 uniformly in Y . Similarly, the setting is semiconvex-buyer if µ concentrates no mass on countably rectifiable hypersurfaces 8 in X 0 , and the surplus function s ∈ C(X × Y ) is locally semiconvex on X 0 uniformly in Y .
As the next examples show, our model falls into the semiconvex-buyer setting whenever the buyer's utility u(x, z) or the surplus function s(x, z) is sufficiently smooth. Although its description appears more technical, the semi-convex buyer setting has the advantage that the measure µ may be more concentrated than the Lipschitz-buyer setting allows. In particular, a measure µ 0 on the interval X 0 = [0, 1] satisfies the semiconvex-buyer hypothesis as long as it assigns zero mass µ 0 ({x}) = 0 to each type x ∈ [0, 1]; it need not be absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, as the Lipschitz-buyer hypothesis would require. This improvement can be traced back to Gangbo and McCann [24] [12] .
Example 3 (Lipschitz-buyer)
If X 0 is a smooth manifold and Y is compact, any surplus function s(x, y) locally Lipschitz on X 0 × Y also satisfies (24) . Similarly if X 0 is a smooth manifold, Z is compact, and v : Y × Z −→ R is arbitrary, any utility function u(x, z) locally Lipschitz on X 0 × Z induces a surplus (4) satisfying the Lipschitz-buyer hypothesis (24) .
Example 4 (Semiconvex-buyer) If X 0 and Y 0 are smooth manifolds and Y 0 is compact, any surplus function s ∈ C 2 (X 0 × Y 0 ) also satisfies (25) . If X 0 and Z 0 are smooth manifolds and Z 0 is compact, and v : Y × Z −→ R is arbitrary, any utility function u ∈ C 2 (X 0 × Z 0 ) induces a surplus (4) satisfying the semiconvex-buyer hypotheses, despite the fact that s(x, y) will not generally be differentiable.
Although the surplus function (4) may fail to be differentiable, the Lipschitzbuyer setting guarantees the surplus s(x, y) is locally Lipschitz 9 with respect to x ∈ X 0 , with Lipschitz constant independent of y ∈ Y . This in turn guarantees any s-convex function q = qs s will be locally Lipschitz on X 0 , hence (by Rademacher's theorem) differentiable on a set Dom Dq ⊂ X 0 of full measure. The derivative Dq(x) is a vector in the cotangent space T * x X 0 to X 0 at the point x ∈ Dom Dq. Given q : X 0 −→ R locally Lipschitz, we define its superdifferential ∂q(x 0 ) at x 0 ∈ X 0 to consist of the set of covectors w ∈ T * x0 X 0 such that
with the error term allowed to depend on x 0 and on the coordinates chosen. For fixed y ∈ Y , we define the superdifferential ∂ x s(x 0 , y) ⊂ T * x 0 X of s(x, y) with respect to x analogously.
Before proceeding, let us state a uniqueness proposition which does not require further assumptions. This proposition asserts µ-a.e. uniqueness of the marginal payoff Dq with respect to buyer type, which may or may not determine the payoff q(x) uniquely depending on the connectivity properties of Spt µ 0 ⊂ X 0 , and whether the participation constraint is active. Still, this proposition yields a point of contact between our work and that of Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame [16] , by giving alternative sufficient conditions on the measures and surplus function to enforce uniqueness of marginal payoffs. Note however, in the absence of further assumptions such as the twist condition from Definition 5, our proof of this proposition may not extend to the Lipschitz-buyer setting. Our proposition is inspired by a pressure uniqueness result of Brenier concerning fluid mechanics [4] . exists, and its support is contained in the closed set S, according to Theorem 1. If X and Y are complete separable metric spaces, let K denote the σcompact carrying the full mass of γ provided e.g., by p. 255 of [8] or Theorem I-55 of [36] , so that µ vanishes outside the σ-compact projection of K ∩ Spt γ through π X . Now suppose x 0 ∈ π X (K ∩ Spt γ) ∩ Dom Dq \ {∅ X }. Then there exists (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ Spt γ ⊂ S, whence the first-order condition for vanishing in (27) implies superdifferentiability of s(x, y 0 ) at
On the other hand, semiconvexity implies subdifferentiability and hence differentiability of x ∈ X 0 −→ s(x, y 0 ) at x 0 , and its super-and subdifferentials must both then coincide with {D x s(x 0 , y 0 )}, as in [12] . Thus Dq(x 0 ) = D x s(x 0 , y 0 ). Notice the right hand side depends only on (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ Spt γ such that x 0 ∈ π X (K ∩ Spt γ) ∩ Dom Dq \ {∅ X }, and is otherwise independent of q. If a second semiconvex functionq minimized (16) , we would similarly have Dq(x 0 ) = D x s(x 0 , y 0 ) = Dq(x 0 ) on the set π X (K ∩ Spt γ) ∩ Dom Dq ∩ Dom Dq of full µ 0 measure, to establish the proposition.
If X and Y are merely subsets of complete separable metric spaces, we use their completionsX andỸ to find a σ-compact setK ⊂X ∩Ỹ carrying the full mass of γ, and establish the result on the intersection of the σ-compact set πX (K ∩ Spt γ) with Dom Dq ⊂ X, which still carries the full mass of µ.
We now state a generalization of the Spence-Mirrlees condition appropriate to the Lipschitz-buyer setting.
Definition 5 (Twisted-buyer condition) In the Lipschitz-buyer setting, a surplus function s :
for all x 0 ∈ X 0 \ X L and y 1 = y 2 in Y . The same definition applies in the semiconvex-buyer setting, except that X L must then lie in a µ-negligible set, such as a countably rectifiable hypersurface. [5] . On the other hand, with the surplus function of Example 2, neither the twisted-buyer nor the twisted-seller condition is satisfied, since s(x, y 1 ) − s(x, y 2 ) = (y 2 ) 2 − (y 1 ) 2 does not depend on x. The twisted-buyer condition has two consequences which are well-known (see [6] , [11] , or [23] ) provided that at equilibrium, participation is complete. It guarantees the Monge-Kantorovich maximization (14) is attained by a unique assignment γ of buyers with sellers. Moreover, it also implies this unique maximizer is pure, meaning there is a mapping f : X → Y defined µ-almost everywhere such that γ = (id X × f ) # µ. The following theorem confirms that the twisted-buyer condition formulated above guarantees uniqueness and purity of the mixed solution even when the situation is complicated by the presence of the isolated point ∅ X in X = X 0 ∪{∅ X } representing the null buyer. The proof makes use of results found in [18] and [2] , which allow us to establish a unique representation of the equilibrium measure simply by showing that almost all 22 sellers have pure preferences at equilibrium. In Appendix A we recapitulate those results and in Appendix B give the full proof of Theorem 2 not only for the sake of completeness, but also to illustrate the efficacy of Lemma 3 and Theorem 4.
Theorem 2 (Twisted-buyers induce pure and unique assignments) ∞[ be a twisted-buyer surplus function, defined on  probability spaces (X, µ) and (Y, ν) in either the Lipschitz-buyer or semiconvexbuyer setting. Then the maximizer γ of (14) on Γ (µ, ν) is unique. Moreover, there is a µ 0 measurable map f :
Proof See Appendix B.
As anticipated, the set (19) takes center stage in the analysis there.
Examples of twisted-buyer costs
Since the surplus depends on the utility functions, it is useful to have criteria on u(x, z) and v(y, z) which guarantee s(x, y) is twisted. One such criterion is given by the following example.
Example 6 Consider the Tinbergen (1956) 
and
This only equals zero when y 1 = y 2 so s (x, y) satisfies the both buyer and seller twist condition.
In this model, the hedonic equilibrium is unique. Buyers' willingness to pay is
If A < 0 and B > 0, buyers with smaller values of |x − z| are willing to pay more for z and sellers with smaller values of |y − z| are willing to accept more. The willingness to pay curves of different buyers never cross. The exact balance of buyers and sellers across locations depends on the distributions of buyer and seller types in the economy. As a more general example in which the twist condition is satisfied, consider the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Utilities yielding a twisted surplus) Let
and z 0 = z 0 (x, y). Then s(x, y) satisfies the twisted-buyer condition.
Proof Ignoring ∅ Z , the surplus function is given by
Since z 0 (x, y) is unique and on the interior of Z 0 by assumption, and since u and v are differentiable, z 0 (x, y) satisfies
The envelope theorem then implies differentiability of s at (x, y), and
If for each x ∈ X 0 , y ∈ Y −→ D x s(x, y) is injective, then s(x, y) satisfies the twist condition. Since Y is convex, a sufficient condition for this is the positive (or negative) definiteness of the quadratic form D 2 xy s(x, y).
zz v(y, z) ≤ 0, and the inequality is strict by hypothesis. The implicit function theorem then implies continuous differentiability of z 0 (x, y) in (28) . Differentiating (29) with respect to y yields
while differentiating (28) with respect to y yields
These combine to give
which, substituted into (30) yields
By hypothesis, this matrix is positive definite as required.
When n = 1, this lemma gives the setting whose empirical properties are studied in Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim [17] . When n = 1, this also reduces to the usual Spence-Mirrlees conditions D 2 xz u = 0 = D 2 yz v on u and v separately plus strict concavity with respect to z of the difference u(x, z) − v(y, z). 24 
The subtwist: a weaker condition for uniqueness
A priori, there does not seem to be any economic reason why the twist condition should be expected to hold. 11 Whether or not twisting is necessary to guarantee purity of assignments for general measures µ 0 and ν 0 in the Lipschitz-buyer setting is an open question. The good news, however, is that it is certainly not necessary to guarantee uniqueness of the assignment γ. Though it is frequently assumed to be satisfied in applications where the spaces of buyers X 0 and sellers Y 0 are subsets of R n , this is not always the case. There are also important settings where twisting cannot be satisfied. Taking X L = ∅ for simplicity, no differentiable surplus function satisfies the twist condition on a compact space X 0 such as the circle or sphere S n := { x 2 = 1 | x ∈ R n+1 }or the periodic cube T n = R n /Z n -since x ∈ X 0 −→ s(x, y 1 ) − s(x, y 2 ) obviously has critical points where its maximum and minimum are attained. If the buyers and sellers were distributed continuously over the surface of the planet or around locations on an expressway encircling a city, there would be no hope of twisting. This situation is not much improved by assuming X L non-empty: no surplus s(Rx, Ry) = s(x, y) ∈ C 1 (S n ×S n ) invariant under all rotations R of the sphere X 0 = S n = Y 0 can be twisted, since no negligible set X L = ∅ is rotationally invariant. Similarly, no surplus s(x+k, y +k) = s(x, y) ∈ C 1 (T n ×T n ) invariant under all translations k ∈ R n can be twisted in the periodic setting. Clearly there are topological obstructions to twisting. It is a fundamental open question to understand when uniqueness of equilibria can be expected to persist in such settings. We give a sufficient condition which resolves this question in settings such as the circle and sphere -where x ∈ X 0 −→ s(x, y 1 )−s(x, y 2 ) has only two critical points. This would not be the case in the periodic setting T 2 , and we do not know a single example of a smooth surplus function for which the (MK) solution to program (14) with µ 0 vol can generally be expected to be unique in this geometry.
The following theorem guarantees uniqueness of the optimal assignment γ. Even when all buyers elect to participate, there are many examples where the unique assignment will not be pure, meaning a positive fraction of buyers remain indifferent between two or more preferred sellers at equilibrium. Definition 6 (Subtwist condition) In the Lipschitz-buyer setting, a surplus function s : X ×Y −→ [0, ∞[ is said to be subtwisted if there is a set X L ⊂ X 0 of zero volume such that whenever ∂ x s(x 0 , y 1 ) intersects ∂ x s(x 0 , y 2 ) for some x 0 ∈ X 0 \ X L and y 1 = y 2 ∈ Y , then x 0 is either the unique global maximum or the unique global minimum of s(x, y 1 ) − s(x, y 2 ) on X = X 0 ∪ {∅ X }. The same definition applies in the semiconvex-buyer setting, except that X L must then lie in a µ-negligible set, such as a countably rectifiable hypersurface.
Example 7 A surplus differentiable with respect to x is subtwisted if and only if there is a negligible set X L ⊂ X 0 of buyers such that: for each distinct pair of sellers, the function x ∈ X 0 \ X L −→ s(x, y 1 ) − s(x, y 2 ) has no critical points except for at most one global maximum and at most one global minimum.
Theorem 3 (Unique equilibria with mixed assignments) If probability spaces (X, µ) and (Y, ν) and a surplus function s(x, y) satisfy the subtwist condition in the Lipschitz-buyer or semiconvex-buyer setting, then the maximizer γ of (14) is unique. Moreover, γ is supported on a numbered limb system with three limbs, as in Definition 7.
Proof See Appendix C.
Circular assignment: example of a subtwisted cost
The preceding theorem generalizes results of Gangbo & McCann [13] and Ahmad [1] . A special case of these earlier results yields the following illustrative example, as in [2] . In Appendix D, we describe an algorithm for computing an approximate solution for this example.
Example 8 (School districts on a ringroad)
Consider a simple model of spatial matching in which a continuum of students and a continuum of schools are located at points on a circular expressway around a city. The pairwise surplus from matching a student to a school is a decreasing function of distance due to commuting costs; in particular, each student x would prefer to be matched to a school with the same location as hers to minimize transportation expenses.
Formally, thus, let X 0 = Y 0 = S 1 and s(x, y) = 1 + cos (2π (x − y)) where each x represents a student and each y represents a school. The rate at which the surplus decreases is increasing for |x − y| ≤ 1 4 . However, it is decreasing for 1 4 ≤ |x − y| ≤ 1 2 . Note that s (x, y) ≥ 0, so that participation is complete. Also, the model does not satisfy the twist condition. Indeed, the surplus s is differentiable, but for any (y 1 , y 2 ) the function s (x, y 1 ) − s (x, y 2 ) admits x = y 1 +y 2 2 ± 1 4 as critical points. Now, assume first that µ = ν, meaning students and schools have the same distribution on the circle. Then the unique solution of the primal surplus maximization problem would have support on the graph y = x. Every student would travel a maximum distance of zero. Any pair (q, r) of non-negative constants q(x) = q 0 and r(y) = r 0 such that q 0 + r 0 = 2 would solve the dual problem. This is a case in which the assignment is unique and pure, despite the fact that the twist condition does not apply. Note however, that the equilibrium price (22) is not uniquely determined until a choice of utility transferred q 0 ∈ [0, 2] is made. This ambiguity in price would be resolved in scenarios where some students or schools choose not to participate, either because of a net imbalance between supply and demand, or due to a uniform increase in the commuting costs. However, the model becomes much more interesting when the densities associated with µ and ν are different. Assume µ and ν are those detailed in Appendix D and shown in Figure 1 . Specifically, the distribution of students is concentrated around x = 1 4 while the distribution of schools is concentrated around y = 3 4 . That is, most of the students live on the north side of the city while most of the schools are located on the south side. In this case, the optimal matching is still unique; but it is very different from the previous case. Indeed, it is impossible to match each student to a school near to their residence. The support of the unique optimal measure, computed using the method described in Appendix D, is shown in Figure 2 . All students x ∈ 0, 1 8 ∪ 3 8 , 1 , are matched to a single school near to their home. For example, x = 0.1 is matched to y = 0.867. All students x ∈ 1 8 , 3 8 are matched to two schools; one at a distance less than or equal to 1 4 and one at a distance greater than 1 4 . In the equilibrium these students are indifferent between the two locations. 12 Students from location x, obtain a surplus equal to q (x) . Schools in location y, obtain a surplus r (y) . The surplus functions of the students and schools are displayed in Figure 3 . The students and schools that are in scarce supply, x = 3 4 and y = 1 4 , obtain the highest surplus. Those who are abundant, x = 1 4 and y = 3 4 , obtain the lowest. The optimal measure assigns a fraction of each of the abundant students and schools to each of two locations, one less than a distance of 1 4 , one greater than this distance. Because there is such a large number of students near x = 1 4 and schools near y = 3 4 , there is a social benefit from having some students travel a great distance. Technically, the measure γ on each branch is calculated as follows. Figure 2 depicts two limbs of a numbered limb system:
The third limb f 1 (y) : 5 8 , 7 8 → {∅ X } is not displayed. These limbs define the support of the optimal measure. The optimal measure is given by
In the example, we see the matches (x, y) ∈ X × Y 0 between γ-a.e. participating pair can be found in the graph of one of two mappings g :
This should be contrasted with the Spence-Mirrlees (twisted) case, where the matches lie on the graph of a single map f : X 0 −→ Y ,à la Monge. It can also be compared with the necessary and nearly sufficient condition given in [18] for a doubly stochastic measure γ ∈ Γ (λ, λ) on the square X 0 = Y 0 = [0, 1] to be extremal, which asserts that the support of γ must lie in a numbered limb system, with at most countably many limbs; see also Appendix A. In our theorem the system consists of three limbs, while in the twisted-buyer case it consists of two limbs. We do not know of any convenient condition on the surplus function which could lead to unique matches γ concentrated on a system with four or more numbered limbs. However, developments so far suggest the maximal number of limbs must generally be linked to the complexity of the (Morse) critical point structure of the function x ∈ X 0 −→ s(x, y 1 ) − s(x, y 2 ).
Alternately, taking student assignments to schools to be fixed, Example 8 can parlayed into an example set on the periodic square T 2 instead of the circle, by allowing students without cars to contract with students who drive to school to achieve desirable carpooling arrangements. There are then two kinds of students, and the type space of each is two-dimensional, consisting of a residential and a school location. In this case, topology forces even the subtwist condition to fail, leaving uniqueness an unresolved issue for all smooth surpluses!
Multiple-agent contracts
The hedonic pricing and matching problems we have discussed admit a natural generalization to the setting in which each contract z requires the participation of k agents chosen from different type spaces (X 1 , µ 1 ), . . . , (X k , µ k ). Carlier and Ekeland [7] study this problem and establish existence of equilibrium. In this section, we show how to formulate their multiple agent contract problem as a linear program, instead of as a convex program.
The case k = 2 has been discussed above, but for k > 2 we assume the utility of contract z ∈ Z to agent x ∈ X i is given by an upper semicontinuous function u i : cl(X i × Z) −→ R ∪ {−∞} plus any compensation P i (z) he receives. Thus the indirect utility available to him is
with the usual convention −∞ + ∞ = −∞. The payments P i (z) are assumed to satisfy a frictionless trading condition 0 = k i=1 P i (z) on Z which prevents arbitrage and neglects friction. Payments corresponding to the null contract must vanish P i (∅ Z ) = 0. As before, each type space X i = X 0 i ∪ {∅ i } includes an isolated dummy agent type of mass
and satisfies
A joint measure α on X 1 × · · · × X k × Z together with frictionless payment schedules P i : Z −→ R ∪ {±∞} represent a market clearing equilibrium if it has marginals π X i # α = µ i for each i = 1, . . . , k, and
holds for each i = 1, . . . , k and α-a.e. (x 1 , . . . , x k , z) ∈ Spt α. Define the non-negative surplus function
The same arguments presented above show equivalence of this hedonic pricing problem to the linear program
where the maximum is taken over all joint measures γ ≥ 0 on X 1 × · · · × X k having prescribed marginals
is taken over functions q i satisfying s(
, with equality if and only if γ is a maximizer and (q 1 , . . . , q k ) minimizes. As before, it follows from q 1 (∅ 1 ) = 0 that q i (∅ i ) = 0 for each i ≤ k. The existence and characterization of maximizers, minimizers, and equilibria is identical, but the literature exploring conditions on the surplus which guarantee uniqueness of the maximizing assignment or assortative matching is much more limited in the multiple marginal case; see [29] [14] for references. The frictionless transfer payment P j (z) required by the agent playing the j-th role in the contract z ∈ Z is related to the equilibrium payoffs q i (x i ) of all types by
Let us also observe that the uniqueness of marginal payoffs proved in Proposition 3 extends immediately to the multiple agent problem. Thus if µ 1 vanishes on all countably rectifiable hypersurfaces of a smooth manifold X 0 1 := X 1 \ {∅ 1 }, and the surplus function s ∈ C(X 1 × . . . X k ) is semiconvex on X 0 1 , uniformly in the other k − 1 variables, and (q 1 , . . . , q k ) minimizes (35) with q 1 semiconvex, then Dq 1 is uniquely determined µ 1 almost everywhere on X 0 1 .
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A Supports of extremal doubly stochastic measures
The uniqueness of optimal assignments is established above using Hestir and William's characterization of extremal doubly stochastic measures in terms of their supports [18] , or more precisely a variant of this characterization formulated by Ahmad, Kim, and McCann [2] . We summarize hereafter the characterization in the form that we need. An important property of pure solutions is that the equilibrium is uniquely determined by the profile of buyers and their strategies. The first result that we shall use from [2] allows us to establish a unique representation of the equilibrium measure simply by showing that almost all sellers have pure preferences at equilibrium, as in Theorem 2. What separates the following lemma from antecedents such as Lemma 2.4 of [13] is that µ 0 -measurability of f is a consequence and not a hypothesis. This improvement was derived using an argument from Villani [37, Theorem 5.28] .
Lemma 3 (Pure measures are push-forwards [2] ) Let X 0 and Y 0 be subsets of complete separable metric spaces, and γ ≥ 0 a σ-finite Borel measure on the product space
The preceding lemma shows that any measure that is concentrated on a graph is uniquely determined by its marginals. This would be the case for optimal measures in the twistedbuyer setting. Uniqueness, however, does not require the twist condition to be satisfied; as the next result demonstrates, the sufficient conditions given by Lemma 3 and Theorem 2 are far from necessary for uniqueness of the equilibrium -a peculiarity of continuous type spaces X.
Given a map f : D −→ Y on D ⊂ X, we denote its graph, domain, range, and the graph of its (multivalued) inverse by
More typically, we will be interested in the Antigraph(g) ⊂ X × Y of a map g : Dom g ⊂ Y −→ X. Following Hestir and Williams [18] we define:
Definition 7 (Numbered limb system) Let X 0 and Y 0 be subsets of complete separable metric spaces.
Notice the map f 0 is irrelevant to this definition though I 0 is not; we may always take Dom(f 0 ) = ∅, but require Ran(f 1 ) ⊂ I 0 . The point of this definition is the following sufficient condition for extremality in Γ (µ, ν). In case Graph(f 2i ) and Antigraph(f 2i−1 ) are (Borel) measurable subsets of X 0 × Y 0 for each i ≥ 1, the sufficiency of this condition was established by Hestir and Williams [18] . The following variant of this result was formulated in Ahmad, Kim and McCann [2] , where a direct proof has also been given. It plays a key role in Theorem 3. If γ assigns zero outer measure to the complement of S in X 0 × Y 0 , we say γ vanishes outside of S. In this case S is γ-measurable, meaning it belongs to the completion of the Borel σ-algebra with respect to the measure γ. 
Here f k is measurable with respect to the η k completion of the Borel σ-algebra. If the system has N < ∞ limbs, then γ k = 0 for k > N , and η k and γ k can be computed recursively from the formulae above starting from k = N .
Measurability of the graphs and antigraphs is required by Theorem 4 only to decompose each candidate γ into countably many pieces, to which Lemma 3 can then be applied.
The application of these results to deduce Theorem 3 also requires an elementary measurability lemma from point set topology: 
The projection H λ k of the closed set G λ k is easily seen to be closed using compactness of B k . Thus h k ≤ h k+1 is a sequence of upper semi-continuous functions increasing monotonically to a Borel limit h = sup k h k on A.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 1 and Remark 1 provide a non-negative s-convex minimizing pair (q, r) = (r s , qs) to the dual problem (16) . Recall that q is then locally Lipschitz on X 0 , by e.g. Theorem 10.26 [37] , and r = qs is lower semi-continuous in (21) by the continuity assumption s ∈ C(X ×Y ). The same theorem shows q to be locally semiconvex in the semiconvex-buyer setting. Let S := {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | q(x) + r(y) − s(x, y) = 0}. denote the closed set where the non-negative function q(x) + r(y) − s(x, y) vanishes. Since µ concentrates no mass on subsets of zero volume and X 0 \ Dom Dq has zero volume, all joint measures γ ∈ Γ (µ, ν) assign full mass to A := (Dom Dq \ X L ) × Y in the Lipschitz-buyer setting, with the convention ∅ X ∈ Dom Dq. The same conclusion is true in the semiconvexbuyer setting, since µ is then assumed to vanish on the countably rectifiable hypersurface where differentiability of q fails, recalling Theorem 10.8(iii) of [37] . Moreover, all optimizers γ ∈ Γ (µ, ν) vanish outside S, according to Theorem 1. At least one optimizer exists, due to the (upper semi-) continuity of s ∈ C(X × Y ). The next step of the proof will be to show that S ∩ A is contained in one of numbered limb systems of Definition 7. After this is established, Theorem 4 will be used to infer there is only one measure in Γ (µ, ν) that vanishes outside S ∩ A, hence the optimizer is unique.
Set I 2 = Y 0 , I 1 = Y and I 0 = {∅ X }. Set f 1 (y) = ∅ X for all y ∈ Dom f 1 = Y . It remains to show that π X (x, y) = x gives an injective map from S 2 := (S ∩ A) ∩ (X 0 × Y ) to Dom f 2 := π X (S 2 ). Once this injectivity has been shown, f 2 can be defined to make id X × f 2 : Dom f 2 −→ S 2 invert π X | S 2 , and a comparison with Definition 7 then reveals that S is contained in a numbered limb system. To prove the required injectivity, suppose (x 0 , y 1 ) and (x 0 , y 2 ) both belong to S 2 ⊂ S∩A. The function q(x)+r(y)−s(x, y) ≥ 0 vanishes at all points in S, hence enjoys 0 as a subgradient there. If this function is differentiable with respect to x at x 0 ∈ Dom Dq \ X L , we have D x s(x 0 , y 1 ) = Dq(x) = D x s(x 0 , y 2 ); otherwise Dq(x 0 ) ∈ ∂ x s(x 0 , y 1 ) ∩ ∂ x s(x 0 , y 2 ). In either case, the twisted-buyer condition yields y 1 = y 2 , whence π X is injective on S 2 .
To invoke Theorem 4, it remains only to establish the γ-measurability of Antigraph(f 1 ) and of Graph(f 2 ) for each γ ∈ Γ (µ, ν) vanishing outside their union. Since Antigraph(f 1 ) = {∅ X } × Y is Borel and disjoint from Graph(f 2 ), the γ-measurability of Graph(f 2 ) follows from the complement of Antigraph(f 1 ) ∪ Graph(f 2 ) having zero γ outer-measure. The µ 0measurability of f 2 : Dom f 2 −→ Y and special form γ = γ 2 + γ 1 with γ 2 = (id X 0 × f ) # µ 0 and γ 1 = (∅ X × id Y ) # (ν − π Y # γ 2 ) are both consequences of Theorem 4, since the set of optimizers in Γ (µ, ν) is non-empty. Thus the theorem is established.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 1 and Remark 1 provide a non-negative s-convex minimizing pair (q, r) = (r s , qs) to the dual problem (16) . As in the proof of that theorem, it costs no generality to replace X and Y by σ-compact sets in the completions cl X and cl Y carrying the full mass of µ and ν respectively. Lower semi-continuity of r (and of q) follows from the same remark since s ∈ C(X × Y ). Recalling that µ 0 vol by hypothesis and that q is locally Lipschitz [37] , let Dom Dq ⊃ {∅ X } denote the Borel subset of X with full µ-measure where q is differentiable. Even in the semiconvex-buyer setting Dom Dq has full µ-measure, because q is locally semiconvex, hence differentiable except on a countably rectifiable hypersurface, to which µ 0 assigns zero mass; see [24] [12] or Theorems 10.8(iii) and 10.26 of [37] . Taking X L ⊂ X 0 as in the subtwist condition, set X R = Dom Dq ∩ X \ X L and let 
